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Ohio Billboard Statutes
or confusion to customers may be present. It appears, however, that the
effectiveness of palming off has not been extinguished, for the majority
of recent decisions construing Sears and Compco infer that recovery for
unfair competition may be had in its presence. But since palming off
is difficult to prove and absent in most cases, the only protection remain-
ing which would afford a plaintiff relief against product simulation is
state law requiring a copier to take such precautionary measures as label-
ing. But this merely protects the consumer against confusion as to the
source of the product; it does not grant the originator the right to exclude
others from making and selling the product. Such a result is consonant
with the policy that whatever is not protected by federal patent or copy-
right law lies in the public domain and may be copied at will.
DAvID R. WILLIAMS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - OHIO BILLBOARD STATUTES -
VALID EXERCISE OF STATE POLICE POWER
Ghaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston, 176 Ohio St. 425,
200 N.E.2d 328 (1964) *
Billboard statutes by their nature impose restrictions on the right of
a private property owner to an unlimited use of his land. The state justi-
fies these restrictions on the rights of private property owners as a valid
exercise of the state police power.' The police power is inherent in the
state2 and has as its purpose and scope the general welfare of the state.3
In this respect, it must be based upon public necessity. The recent pro-
nouncement by the Ohio Supreme Court in Ghaster Properties, Inc. v.
Preston4 raises a question as to the scope of the term "public necessity"
* The trial court decision in the subject case is noted in 14 W REs. I.. REv. 819 (1963).
The subsequent disposition of the case in the Ohio Supreme Court makes this a highly pro-
pitious time for a re-examination of an exercise of the police power to regulate billboards in
Ohio.
1. Although the usual justification for a statute of this type is a necessary use of the police
power of the state, an interesting argument has been raised to base the statute on real prop-
erty law. In Wilson, Billboards and The Right To Be Seen From the Highway, 30 GEo. LJ.
723 (1942), the writer argues that since the easement of visibility which arises by virtue of
the abutter's location is an easement appurtenant, its exploration is necessarily restricted to
the purposes connected with the use and enjoyment of the dominant estate. Since an appur-
tenant estate is concerned here, it would follow that the owner of the fee cannot authorize
others to utilize the easement for purposes unconnected with the use and enjoyment of the
dominant estate.
2. State ex rel Zugravu v. O'Brien, 130 Ohio St. 23, 196 N.E. 664 (1935); Van Gunten
v. Worthley, 25 Ohio App. 496, 159 N.E. 326 (1927).
3. State v. Boone, 84 Ohio St. 346, 95 N.E. 924, af'd, 85 Ohio St. 313, 97 N.E. 975 (1911);
Mirick v. Gims, 79 Ohio St. 174, 86 N.E. 880 (1908); Champaign County v. Church, 62
Ohio St. 318, 57 N.E. 50 (1900); see OHIO CONST. Preamble.
4. 176 Ohio St. 425, 200 N.E.2d 328 (1964).
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in Ohio. More specifically, the Ghaster case involves the Ohio billboard
statutes which restrict types of advertising devices5 and prohibit placing
these devices within 660 feet of the edge of the right of way of a highway
in the interstate system.6 All advertising devices which violate this stat-
ute are declared a public and private nuisance and are subject to removal
by the state thirty days after notice to the owner or lessee of the land.'
In the Ghaster case, the plaintiff owned three parcels of land which
had been leased to another plaintiff, Ghaster Outdoor Advertising Com-
pany. The Ghaster Company, as lessee, had maintained seven outdoor ad-
vertising signs on this land which were alleged to be in violation of sec-
tions 5516.01 and 5516.02 of the Ohio Revised Code. The trial court
declared the statutes unconstitutional, holding that they constituted
a taking of property in violation of the due process clause. In this re-
spect, the court found that the statutes had no substantial relation to
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare?
The court of appeals reversed in part, holding that although there
was no evidence upon which to base a finding that the Ghaster signs con-
stituted any threat to the safety of the traveling public or to the public
in general, the state might have the authority independent of the police
power to justify the enforcement of the billboard statutes. However, the
court avoided further discussion of this point by holding the statutes un-
constitutional as applied in the case before them.
We conclude that in its application to the subject propertes of
Ghaster Properties, Inc. it is unconstitutional.
On the evidence herein we cannot and do not determine the con-
stitutionality of said Bill in its application to other properties not herein
specifically involved nor do we determine the constitutionality of said
Bill in its enactment.9
The supreme court, however, declared the statutes to be constitutional,
both in enactment and application.'" Using the definition of "taking" in
5. OHIO Rnv. CODE § 5516 [hereinafter cited as CODE 5].
6. CODE § 5516.02.
7 CODE § 5516.04.
8. Ghaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston, 184 N.E.2d 552, 557 (Ohio C.P. 1962), noted in 14
W REs. L. REv. 819 (1963) Defendant attempted to prove that there was a substantial re-
latioa between the statutes and highway safety. The court held that there was no evidence to
show that billboards caused accidents, but rather that they tend to alert drivers, to keep them
actively attentive to roadway conditions, thereby preventing "highway hypnosis."
9. Ghaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston, 194 N.E.2d 158, 161 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963) (Em-
phasis added.)
10. Ghaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston, 176 Ohio St. 425, 200 N.E.2d 328 (1964)
11. 176 Ohio St. 282, 199 N.E.2d 595 (1964) Judge Matthias declared that an actual
taking of private property must involve either physical displacement of a person from space
in which he was entitled to exercise dominion consistent with ownership or by showing that a




McKee v. City of Akron,1 the court declared that depriving an owner of
an unrestricted use of his land does not necessarily amount to a taking of
his property, but is rather a restriction of the superadded claim to use pri-
vate lands to intrude on the public ways. 2 The court further stated that
the billboard statutes do bear a real and substantial relation to public wel-
fare by (1) "promoting public safety," and (2) "promoting the comfort,
convenience, and peace of mind of those who use the highway, by remov-
ing annoying intrusions upon that use."'" Once the issue of constitution-
ality had been resolved, the court found no difficulty in applying the bill-
board statutes tb the seven Ghaster signs, although only three of the
signs were visible on an interstate highway.'4
The court's two reasons for upholding the statutes as being a
valid exercise of state police power deserve further analysis. The general
requisite of a valid exercise of police power was stated in City of Youngs-
town v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co.,'5 wherein the court held that "there must
be an essential public need for the exercise of the police power in order to
justify its use."' 6 More specifically, the factors upon which a valid exer-
cise of police power may rest are usually limited to four: (1) health,
(2) safety, (3) morals, and (4) general welfare. Thus, an exercise of
the police power will usually be considered valid only if it bears a real and
substantial relation to these four categories of public need.' For ex-
ample, in considering the validity of zoning ordinances, the court in Curtis
v. City of Cleveland8 stated that "such legislation will not be considered
invalid. . within the meaning of constitutional limitations, where such
12. Ghaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston, 176 Ohio St. 424, 430, 200 N.E.2d 328, 332 (1964).
On this point the court also cited General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub.
Works, 289 Mass. 149, 193 N.E. 799 (1935). Id. at 432, 200 N.E.2d at 334.
13. Ghaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston, supra note 12, at 438, 200 N.E.2d at 337. Plaintiff
attempted further to raise the argument that the statutes involved in the instant case were
unconstitutional because they infringe the right of free speech. This bizarre argument, dis-
cussed in 64 COLMI L Ri. 81 (1964), was attempted in New York v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d
462, 191 N.E.2d 272, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S.-42 (1963). In that case, defendant strung
clotheslines in her front and side yards protesting property taxes. A zoning ordinance, Rye,
N.Y., General Ordinances, 5 4-37 (1961), was passed which prohibited erection and main-
tenance of clotheslines in front and side yards without a permit from the city. Defendant's
application for such a permit was denied, but she continued to display the lines and was sub-
sequently convicted of violating the ordinance. Defendant claimed that the clothesline display
was a form of nonverbal protest against the tax assessment and that the ordinance was invalid
as to her because it constituted an unconstitutional infringement on her freedom of speech.
14. Of the seven Ghaster signs, one was visible to traffic on Interstate Route 75 only, two
were visible to traffic on Interstate Route 75 and on access roads leading thereto, and four were
not visible to traffic on Interstate Route 75, but only to traffic on such access roads.
15. 112 Ohio St. 654, 148 N.E. 842 (1925).
16. Id. at 661, 148 N.E. at 844.
17. Curtis v. City of Cleveland, 170 Ohio St. 127, 163 N.E.2d 682 (1959); Benjamin v.
City of Columbus, 167 Ohio St. 103, 146 N.E.2d 854 (1957); City of Cincinnati v. Correll,
141 Ohio St. 535, 49 N.E.2d 412 (1943); Olds v. Klotz, 131 Ohio St. 447, 3 N.E.2d 371
(1936); Smith v. Troy, 18 Ohio L. Abs. 476 (Ct. App. 1934),
18. 170 Ohio St. 127, 163 N.E.2d 682 (1959).
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legislation bears a real and substantial relation to the public health, safety,
morals or general welfare and is not unreasonable or arbitrary"1
Although repeated attempts have been made to extend the general
welfare category to include aesthetics as a basis for a valid exercise of
police power, the Ohio courts have not favored legislation founded solely
on aesthetic considerations.2 ' Even though the courts have been sympa-
thetic to aesthetic considerations, they still find no valid basis upon which
to uphold such legislation. For example, in State ex rel Srzgley v Wood-
worth,2 the court expressed the obvious dilemma. "It seems unfortunate
that the police power is adequate to prohibit offensive sounds and smells,
but is helpless against things that are only ugly in appearance and
such is the undoubted rule, that the police power cannot be invoked by
esthetic considerations."
22
The state is therefore charged with a difficult task in determining the
extent of its police power: balancing a property owner's right to the
use of his property against the common good of the citizen of the state
guarded by police power.2' Applying these principles to the billboard
statutes, a court must determine whether the subsequent benefits to the
citizens of the state, e.g., public safety on the highway, are sufficient to
warrant a restriction on private property In Ghaster, the court's two rea-
sons for upholding the Ohio billboard statutes are difficult to justify First,
the public safety argument seems extremely weak as a reason for prohibit-
ing advertising signs. The plaintiff supplied evidence which demon-
strated that these signs were not traffic hazards. 4 However, the court
refused to consider this evidence because it felt that this was a matter for
the legislature, and that legislative determination and judgment should
not be disturbed unless manifestly unreasonable.25 The general welfare
argument, or as phrased by the court, "promoting the comfort, conven-
19. Id. at 130, 163 NXE.2d at 685.
20. See State ex rel Jack v. Russell, 162 Ohio St. 281, 123 N.E.2d 261 (1954); Wondrak
v. Kelley, 129 Ohio St. 268, 195 N.E. 65 (1935); Pritz v. Messer, 112 Ohio St. 628, 149
N.E. 30 (1925); Cleveland Trust Co. v. Village of Brooklyn, 92 Ohio App. 351, 110 N.E.2d
440 (1952); Peebles v. State, 25 Ohio L. Abs. 545 (Ct. App. 1937)
21. 33 Ohio App. 406, 169 N.E. 713 (1929).
22. Id. at 411, 169 N.E. at 715.
23. See, e.g., Direct Plumbing Supply v. City of Dayton, 138 Ohio St. 540, 38 N.E.2d 70
(1941)
24. At the trial court level, plaintiff propounded certain interrogatories which were answered
by defendant. Defendant did not have any official record which showed or purported to
show that any accident had ever been caused on any state highway in the State of Ohio by an
advertising sign located off the highway right-of-way on private property.
25. In the trial court it was stated that billboards are not safety hazards and "if any such
relation is shown, at all, it is to the effect that these devices are beneficial to safety." Ghaster
Properties, Inc. v. Preston, 184 N.E.2d 552, 557 (Ohio C.P 1962) (Emphasis added.)
See also United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen, 76 N.J. Super. 301, 184 A.2d
441 (1962), wherein a New Jersey court decided after considering two traffic accident studies
that billboards were neither a traffic hazard nor a nuisance.
[VoL 16:431
Ohio Billboard Statutes
ience, and peace of mind of those who use the highway" is even weaker.
Here, the court apparently gave substantial consideration to the negative
effect such signs may have on the beauty of a given landscape. Advocat-
ing a retention of natural beauty along the highway would indicate that
the court sought to promote aesthetics.26 Thus, although Ohio courts
have long held that aesthetics alone do not constitute a sufficient basis
for a valid exercise of the police power, it would seem that the supreme
court departed from the established law in Ghaster By inserting aesthet-
ics into the general welfare category, the court has in effect held that
aesthetics now constitutes a valid basis in Ohio for exercise of the police
power. Furthermore, the court has, by implication, said that the Ohio
legislature is competent to determine both what beauty is and that this
beauty is what the community likes and acclaims as necessary. Also, the
court in effect has said that the community as a whole believes that the
natural landscape is appealing to the aesthetic sense - so appealing and
so necessary as to outweigh the rights and interests of private property
owners.
The importance of the Ghaster decision does not lie in whether the
result may be in keeping with the general demands of the community, but
rather in the court's implication that aesthetics is now a matter of gen-
eral welfare in Ohio; hence a sufficient basis for a valid exercise of
police power. Now that the initial step has been taken, it will be left to
future courts to either limit the Ghaster decision to its facts, or enlarge
upon the court's reasoning and develop aesthetics as a basis for police
power exercise in areas other than billboard regulation. The consequences
of such an extension would be-serious, the greatest of which is perhaps
a complete loss of personal aesthetic choice.
DAVID A. BASINSKI
26. Chief Justice Taft's opinion in Ghaster states that "beauty may not be queen but she is
not an outcast beyond the pale of protection or respect. The maintenance of the natural
beauty of areas along interstate highways is to be taken into account-in determining whether
the police power is properly exercised. Outdoor life must lose much -of its charm and
pleasure if this form of advertising is permitted to continue unhampered. " Ghaster Prop-
erties, Inc. v. Preston, 176 Ohio St. 425, 436-37, 200 NE.2d 328; 336-37 (1964).
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